The feasibility of a multidimensional African Standby Force (ASF) 
Introduction
Today, unlike yester-years, fighting is rarely carried out between uniformed soldiers from two or more national armies. With the decrease in inter-state warfare and the growth of internal conflicts and terrorist groups, 1 conflict dynamics have moved into what this paper calls 'the informal sector.' In the informality of warfare and asymmetric conflicts, combatants rarely have uniforms, even in circumstances where they wore uniform, camouflage is the order of the day. 2 Frequently, it is extremely difficult to identify who is fighting for whom. However, it is important to note that this confusion is strategic, as it allows individuals and combat units to operate more freely and with less risk of sanctions since the command structures are harder to identify and 'prove'. Nevertheless, while there may be fewer military battle casualties, there are high human costs, including civilian casualties; they target hospitals and other humanitarian infrastructures. Hence, rendering the war, unlawful and less conformity with the 'rules of engagement' at least according to the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 3 Owing to this complex peace operation architecture on the continent, there is dire need to consolidate capacities and to build an integrated force with diverse skill sets among peacekeeper.
This is more so in Africa because there is unpresented growth of ideological extremism and radicalization of youth. Despite this state of affair, an African-owned intervention strategy is yet to be operationalised. 4 Nevertheless, efforts towards addressing this menace are underway, 3 Force (ASF). 6 In March 2005, a Road Map for the operationalization of the ASF was adopted at an AU experts meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The main objective of this arrangement 7 was to develop multidimensional capacities (military, police and civilian peacekeepers) for deployment in crisis situations. 8 The Road Map for operationalization was earmarked for 2010 as an Initial Operation Capability (IOC) and 2015 for Full Operation Capability (FOC). 9 Several structural and systemic factors such as the inadequate political will, and the limited involvement of the local population in the planning and execution of peace processes have been attributed to sluggishness in realization of an integrated ASF. 10 The ratification of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIR) has raised more questions than solutions to the impasse. 11 Scholars have proffered institutional failure for the ASF's inoperative. 12 First, the traditional reluctance of African states to yield sovereignty to supranational arrangement considerably obstructs political cooperation and integration towards a Pan-African ASF. Without some transfer of decision-making and intervening power to the regional level, member states could pursue their own national interests with few institutional constraints, often at the cost of the broader integrated ASF agenda. Second, the hegemonic tendencies of some AU member states, often subvert good ideas into politico-ideological differences among bureaucrats in Addis
Ababa. This often leads to failure to reach common position on further cooperation or integration. Third, the weak economic and infrastructural base of most African countries and the perceived unequal gains from the regional peace and security arrangements obstructs the evolution of ASF. Fourth, the overlapping memberships of many African states in multiple regional bodies often leads to conflicts of loyalty and usurps efforts that would otherwise drive the operationalization of ASF.
Since the 1960s, African states have embraced regional integration as the key to political cooperation and building functional institutions for tackling challenges facing the continent, including peace and security threats. Although several initiatives have been taken to realize such 4 dreams, structural limitations pose challenges in equal measure. Some critiques of the AU institutions have observed that one of the key problems restraining Africa from achieving its development, peace and security goals is the way in which governance in Africa and institutions at various levels are constituted, structured and managed. 13 The consequences of these weaknesses are that they have an inhibitive effect on the ability of these structures to mobilize and deploy human capacities. Poor leadership and cynical relationships between sub-regions partly shape these structural and systemic problems, thus hindering meaningful generation of proportional capacities required to conduct peace operation. In view of this protracted structural and systemic failures, some scholars have observed that some African heads of state's support to collective efforts, be it economic or security, is merely driven by parochial-individual needs to enhance their image and stature through forays in foreign affairs. 14 Yet, it is only through genuine improvement in these factors that the operationalization of ASF can have increased chance of success. But as this article illustrates, compared with its policy requirements, insufficient enhancement in such conditions means ASF or even the recently instituted ACIRC will continue to remain a dream in the face of increased violent extremism and complex peacekeeping operations. It is a fact that donors and development partners are running out of patience in pumping resources in building regional mechanisms (RMs) that seem to lack an important parameter-timelines for operationalization.
In both academic and policy arena, seldom has any discussion really queried the necessity of these mechanisms vis-à-vis peace operation effectiveness. Thus, this article is a contribution to a dispassionate, empirically based understanding of the dynamics surrounding institutional evolution of the ASF. It challenges earlier accounts that ASF has attained multidimensional status by demonstrating its structural and systemic short-comings, at the same time suggesting a reconfiguration of these RMs so as to face the unprecedented asymmetric war fare and intraconflicts that continues to pose threats to peace and security across Africa. Indeed, with increasing number of asymmetric warfare and intricacies of human security failure in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 15 the question has become more complicated as to whether the peacekeeping force of numbers and the possession of a combat-ready force-is the panacea for peace operations success? 16 In this article we doubt that the concept of the ASF and ACIRC as they conceptualized and progressed can be lauded; and if the ASF and ACIRC are somewhat laudable, as an increasing number of policy analysts argue, then the time and effort put into these mechanisms should be ploughed into processes with more impact on success of PSOs. 17 For example rather than exorbitantly investing in ambivalent structures and defense sectors, AU in collaboration with RMs and regional economic communities (RECs) could strengthen liaison and coordination mechanisms for the already existing capacities (development, humanitarian, political etc) towards conflict preventive diplomacy initiatives.
Building Structures We Can't Use: The Fundamental Paradox?
There are radical views that the AU is an elitist and statist framework whose roles and functions as an overarching institution need to be re-thought. 18 In regard to the need for institutional reforms, Vusi Gumede, one of the leading African development scholars has recommended that in order for rethinking to happen among African leaders, the continent need to build a culture of thought leadership in those bestowed with responsibilities of driving the African development agenda. 19 In response to these sour civil-military relations, observers have cautioned that this type of behavior from both sides may lead to fragmentation of peace operation actors hence hindering the attainment of effective multidimensional capacities. 23 In order to address this policy dilemma, this article will ground the discussion on key concepts drawn from the civil-military relations theoretical framework In order to address this policy dilemma, this article will ground the discussion on key concepts drawn from the civil-military relations theoretical framework 24 , followed by discussion on the normative and practical causes of civil-military discordance.
Analysis of the difficulties encountered by other salient actors on peace and security, such as the the Civil Society Organization (CSO) in engaging the AU will be done and, finally the article will conclude by highlighting policy options for PSO and peacekeeping actors on the continent and beyond. According to Samuel Huntington, the notion of civilian denotes the executive arm of the government led by the head of state. 33 Based on the American society, "the soldier or military, is a professional man who exists only to respond to the rare emergency, and then disappears from 10 sight until needed again." However, Huntington cautions against politicians interfering with the military, lest there be anarchy. 34 He further argues that with the achievement of objective civilian control, there would be a balancing distribution of political power between civilians and military spheres. 35 In our view, this presents the most auspicious contribution towards modern politics, peace, security and more recently, and the phenomenon of multidimensional approach to peace and security that has blossomed among nations including those in Africa.
Moreover, the other typology of civility is the general public as they relate with the uniformed personnel, either in the streets, barracks or in peace missions. Over time, states have regionalized their power, governance, security and politics. As a result of this regional integration, macro states have emerged. Some refer to them as regional blocs or communities.
Within these communities of nations and specifically within the African regional integration rubric, security arrangements have emerged, simply referred to as regional mechanisms or standby forces. These structures form part of the AU's institutional development. Formation of the ASF structures followed what Skocpol refers to as normative institutionalism. 36 As Frances Cleaver 37 puts it, the emergence of these institutions is as a result of combining structures (both physical and social), actions (such as PSO training) and processes (e.g. policy formulation). All these processes are mediated by norms and values of those driving the processes.
The functional interaction between civilians and the military is key to these processes. As we shall see, the outcome of the ASF evolution towards multidimensional status has not been linear. Instead, it is roughed by dynamics of power relations between the military, police and civilians. At the strategic level, the power relation game gets intensified with the oversight regional bodies sometimes engaging in ill competition for donors and duplication of efforts, ultimately leading to discordance.
Macro-level Issues and Multidimensionalism
In the last two decades, the world has seen a proliferation of asymmetric warfare s from rebel armies to insurgency cells, government-linked paramilitaries to local defence groups. linkages with the local community that enables the Commission to tap from the local knowledge through forums and sporting activities using the bottom-up strategy in development of policies and dissemination of the same policies to the locals. In this case, matters of peacekeeping are well publicized among citizens for their contribution to the Commission. This is achieved through various platforms, including engagement of civil society organizations working for peace and stability in the region. 45 On the contrary, the gap between the EAC, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the EASF has been attributed to the duplication of efforts among regional organizations and mechanisms in the region. 46 The dissonance among these regional structures plays a more regressive than progressive role. For instance, one of the objectives of IGAD is to foster peace and security, but there exist no solid coordination mechanism to ensure that both institutions are coherent towards addressing peace and security challenges in the sub-region.
Building consensus on areas of cooperation is subject to both historical and structural challenges, as is the case with Tanzania (dual participation in SADC and EAC) presents both challenges and opportunities for further work on harmonization of the various peace and security regimes.
Scholars have warned that the sub-region's fragile integration is responsible for the sluggishness in realization of common security pacts, owed to several factors, among them; perception of lack of political will, repeated mistakes of the past, lack of preparedness to implement the treaties in its entirety and distrust among the political leaders. For instance, Tanzania initially challenged admission of Rwanda and Burundi, citing that such a move would compromise members 14 domestic industries, or relative stability, the same reasons were initially fronted against the admission of the recently joined South Sudan. 47 These structural factors are sustained by issues of political economy of leadership in the region. embrace the concept of a 'thinking' soldier, in which case, peacekeepers must be willing to exercise resilience, flexibility and adapt to the operational environment. 54 On this particular initiative, the police recorded the least transition rate of 27 (21%). Moreover, the military was found to record the highest (60) number of untrained peacekeepers on the exercise while civilian and police components remain under-represented. This was partly attributed to lack of structures 16 and systems for maintaining database and uncoordinated efforts among stakeholders involved in building capacities of peacekeepers.
It is evident that inability of any peacekeeping force to deploy a multidimensional force risks missing opportunities to make peace and protect civilians in hostile environments. Indeed, both humanitarian practitioners and military scientists have alluded to the fact that multidimensional peacekeeping forces have the ability to perform duties outside physical security, 55 especially in complex situations such as Somalia so as to handle shocks related to poverty, 56 clan division and environmental problems. The ASF structures are also influenced by national politics in the respective member states. For example, until 2012, Uganda and Burundi were the only bold countries contributing troops bilaterally to Somalia. 57 Only 1,700 troops had been operating in Somalia against the AU benchmark of 8,000 troops. Logistical challenges, lack of political commitment and absence of a coordination mechanism to mobilize civilian expertise has been blamed for lack of adequate capacities within AMISOM. Yet, the magnitude of the situation required a multi-dimensional peace mission with estimated strength of 35,000
personnel. remain rigid and thus a hindrance to modern counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques. Amid these authoritarian tendencies among the military personnel, the greatest concern is that, there comes increased exposure of the society to all sorts of security risks, abuse, forceful recruitment, sexual abuse, detention and denied access to development opportunities. Most of these challenges could be addressed through multi-agency, democratic and multidimensional approaches. 65 In the next section, the article, interrogates the difficulties faced by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in engaging the AU. CSOs are here regarded as agents of change geared towards a multidimensional approach to PSO. This requires innovativeness on how to embed non-state actors in decision-making processes.
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Militarization of the Peace Operation Architecture: An Exclusive Club?
There are several ways of increasing multidimensionality of ASF and its regional structures. Direct engagement of civil society organizations with AU is one of such approaches. Second, there is the perpetual problem of information failure. There is no culture of allowing access to information among the AU institutions making it challenging to engage without free flow of information. Currently, much of the information, which gets out is obtained through interpersonal relationships, and subsequently shared amongst CSOs. This presents the relationship unpredictable and that reliance on personal relationship to access information is not sustainable. This is partly because, the AU's decision making process is confined to member states. According to the AU Act, 'decisions' of the AU Assembly are divided into three categories: regulation, directives and recommendations, declarations, resolutions and opinions.
Regulations and directives are binding on members and AU organs, while decisions in the third category are not binding on Member States. In practice, the Assembly mostly uses two terms, decisions and resolutions, to denote its binding and non-binding findings, respectively. All decision-making is characterized by consensus-seeking and the principle of equitable regional representation. If decisions are not reached by consensus, a two-thirds majority is required. 69 Similar challenges have been cited at country level. Jonathan Makuwira observes that, while the change from dictatorial regimes in Malawi to a multiparty political system has enhanced civil society participation in the country's social, economic and political issues, the CSO-government relationship is still fraught with suspicion and mistrust. 70 Thirdly, the lack of enough resources remains a challenge to CSO-AU engagement.
Engaging at the continental level is resource intensive, not only for attending meetings, obtaining 
